Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo gave a speech last week on liquidity regulation at The Clearing House 2014 Annual Conference. He laid out some pretty big themes, including the value of regulation, why Lenders of Last Resort (LOLR) matter and why the Federal Reserve was created to begin with. He also talked about recent actions in strengthening liquidity regulation in the financial system. His conclusions were that regulators are preparing to be broad-sweeping in their capture and regulation of financial market liquidity wherever it may occur.
With BNY Mellon’s new Liquidity Aggregator tool hitting the market last week, we got to thinking about what pre-trade collateral and liquidity management tools would look like and what it will take for the market to adopt these tools.
An article in Bloomberg BusinessWeek, “EU Weighs Curbs on Banks’ Use of Client Assets as Collateral” by Jim Brunsden last week, discussed a move that could have some serious ramifications for repo.
An article in the June 1, 2012 Business Week by Jody Shenn and Lisa Abramowicz, “Cantor Plans to Enter Shrinking Shadow Banking”, took us by surprise. Cantor Fitzgerald is starting a repo conduit called Institutional Secured Funding. For those who aren’t familiar with repo conduits, they are classic shadow banking. Traditional repo conduits allow securities dealers to obtain financing for the weird, wonderful and illiquid by repo’ing in those assets and issuing asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) to fund themselves. Ratings agencies rely on the credit worthiness of the repo bank to support the repo conduits’ rating and could pretty much care less about the collateral. So the paper that goes in can be stuff that otherwise might not be eligible in tri-party shells or for bi-lateral repo trades.
A new opinion piece from Woodbine Associates published on April 4, 2012 “Beyond Volcker: Seeing the Forest through the Trees” caught our eye. About half-way into the piece the author addresses the impact of the Volcker Rule on market liquidity.
Late last year the CFTC proposed changes in the rules governing how Futures Commission Merchants (FCMs) invest client cash. Those rules — 30.7 and especially 1.25 – become infamous post MF Global. The evolution of those rules is well known. In December 2000 the CFTC allowed FCMs to invest client money is securities beyond US Govies and Munis, including “…general obligations issued by any enterprise sponsored by the United States, bank certificates of deposit, commercial paper, corporate notes, general obligations of a sovereign nation, and interests in money market mutual funds…” in the mix. In 2004 and 2005 the rules were again amended, one change allowed internal repos between the FCM and an affiliated broker/dealer. The rest is history.
The LTRO continues to attract attention. With another tranche coming up on February 29th, pundits relish in writing about how much money the banks will make by buying sovereign debt and funding it via the LRTO. We are sure some banks, encouraged (or not) by government officials, will make that “free lunch” investment. (We would be remiss if we didn’t draw a parallel between the LTRO financing and MF Global’s sovereign “Hail Mary” play.) But it is hard to believe that any bank beyond the most desperate will use all that cash just to buy sovereign debt.
Securities Lending Times had a great comment out this morning: securities lending and repo came up the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) liquidity conference yesterday. A group of economists were discussing deleveraging in financial markets and brought up, without any apparent prompting, that securities lending and repo needed to regain some lost activity in order to support other parts of financial markets. This is extremely interesting to us for the following reasons:
On January 20th we posted “Is the collateral upgrade trade a red herring?“. This isn’t the first time we have written about the complexities of collateral swaps. Last October we posted “Derivsource: Collateral Transformation, Silver Bullet or Smoke and Mirrors”. We too questioned the maturity mismatch between long dated swaps which need collateral posted in CCPs for years and the short term nature of the Securities Lending business. We wrote,
Euromoney just published an interview with IMF Economist Manmohan Singh. A link is here. Singh has written extensively on securities financing, collateral chains, shadow banking, and re-hypothecation — all things near and dear to us. We have referred to his writings in Finadium research pieces (here is a link) as well as other www.secfinmonitor.com posts (including this one where his paper was cited for things he never really wrote….a link is here). He knows what he is talking about. We’ll summarize what we think are the interesting parts of the interview and do a little editorializing.